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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000117

SIPDIS

CINCSOC - FOR POLAD ROBERT FITTS FROM THE AMBASSADOR
CINCPAC FOR ADMIRAL FARGO AND COMSOPAC
USASFC FOR MG LAMBERT
USASOC FOR LTG KESSINGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2013
TAGS: [MASS](#) [MCAP](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: NEPAL: AN EXTRAORDINARY TRAINING GROUND FOR U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

1. (C) Dear Bob:

I was disappointed to learn that Nepal is not included on USSOCOM's High Value Target List. As I understand it, if Nepal is not on this list, it will be difficult for U.S. Special Operations Forces to conduct deployments and training here. I hope I can enlist your support to press for adding Nepal as a prime potential training ground for U.S. Special Forces.

2. (C) As you know, Nepal has been combating a violent Maoist insurgency over the past seven years. The insurgents seek to topple the legitimate Government of Nepal through force and set up an old-style Maoist dictatorship. The conflict has grown increasingly brutal and destructive in the past year, as the insurgents have intensified their struggle and widened their scope of targets to include public infrastructure (schools, roads, power stations), transportation, and innocent civilians, including children. In many ways, Nepal's Maoists, who espouse the ideology of the Sendero Luminoso and the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), provide a textbook example of classic, left-wing domestic insurgencies, while demonstrating violent tactics on a par with the Khmer Rouge. Also classic is the Maoists' anti-Americanism, which continues to threaten our interests and affect the security of our personnel and facilities in Nepal. In November the Maoist leadership acknowledged responsibility for the assassinations of two local Embassy security guards and issued an implicit warning to our diplomatic mission to cease anti-Maoist activities. The USG is currently reviewing the possibility of adding the Maoists to one of its terrorist lists.

3. (C) Obviously, continued instability in Nepal, a struggling, impoverished new democracy wedged between two huge nuclear powers, could be a recipe for disaster in what is already a volatile region. It is plain to most observers that the Government of Nepal will be unable to counter this insurgency without significant external assistance. In January 2002 the US Government thus re-oriented its policy specifically to support the Government of Nepal in its efforts to combat the insurgency through a combination of diplomatic efforts, socio-economic aid and security assistance, including small arms, force protection equipment, NVGs, and training. The cornerstone of our security assistance is a planned Counter-Insurgency center to train a Royal Nepal Army (RNA) cadre that will act as a mobile training team in Nepal. These military assistance efforts rely heavily on our ability to employ Special Operations Forces (SOF), particularly US Army Special Forces. These professionals are uniquely suited to train the RNA, a professional, dedicated and disciplined fighting force that I believe will benefit substantially from the instruction provided. In return, our Special Forces would gain invaluable experience in rugged, challenging terrain ranging from dense jungle to the highest Himalayan Mountains.

4. (C) If we continue to exert pressure on the Maoists in Nepal, I am confident that it will increase the likelihood of a peaceful resolution to this conflict. USSOCOM forces are key in this strategy, and to helping transform the RNA into a modern COIN force in the shortest possible time. I would greatly appreciate your support and assistance.

5. (U) Best regards,
Mike

MALINOWSKI